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Abstract	  	  
City	   has,	   from	   its	   inception,	   paid	   close	   attention	   to	   London,	   to	   the	   ‘World-­‐’	   or	  ‘Global	  City’	   ideologies	  underwriting	   its	  concentration	  of	  wealth	  and	  of	  poverty	  and	  to	  challenges	  from	  among	  its	  citizens	  to	  the	  prevailing	  orthodoxy.	  This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  London’s	  extreme	  experience	  of	  the	  housing	  crisis	  gripping	  the	  UK	  —itself	   the	   European	  nation	  with	   the	   fastest	   long-­‐term	   growth	   of	   average	   house	  prices	  and	  widest	  regional	  disparities,	  both	  driven	  by	  overblown	  financialisation	  and	   the	   privileging	   of	   rent	   as	   a	   means	   of	   wealth	   accumulation,	   often	   by	  dispossession.	   Londoners’	   experiences	   stem	   partly	   from	   four	   decades	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   transformation,	   and	   partly	   from	   accelerated	   financialisation	   in	   the	   last	  two	  decades	   and	  are	  now	  being	  accelerated	  by	   the	   imposition	  of	   ‘austerity’	   on	  low-­‐	   and	   middle-­‐income	   people.	   The	   social	   relationships	   of	   tenancy	   in	   social	  housing,	   private	   tenancy	   and	   mortgage-­‐financed	   owner-­‐occupation	   are,	  however,	  divisive	  and	  the	  paper	  ends	  by	  identifying	  what	  may	  be	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  unified	  social	  movement,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  coalition,	  for	  change.	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Introduction	  	  
This	  paper	  frames	  the	  housing	  situation	  in	  the	  UK	  —and	  London	  within	  it—	  
as	  a	  key	  element	  in	  the	  malaise,	  or	  perhaps	  crisis,	  of	  the	  whole	  society	  and	  
economy.	  The	   falling	   share	  of	   the	   social	   product	   ending	  up	   as	  wages	   and	  
salaries	   combines	   with	   growing	   income	   inequality	   among	   earners	   and	  
growing	  wealth	   inequality	  to	  produce	  a	  widening	  gulf	  between	  those	  who	  
can	  afford	  to	  house	  themselves	  in	  the	  market	  sectors	  and	  those	  who	  can’t.	  
In	   the	   three	   or	   four	   decades	   of	   neo-­‐liberalism,	   the	   non-­‐market	   housing	  
sector	  (in	  the	  UK	  mainly	  council	  housing	  provided	  by	  local	  authorities	  but	  
also	  3rd	  sector	  housing	  associations)	  has	  been	  eroded	  while	  the	  need	  for	  it	  
has	   grown.	  Meanwhile	   the	   financialisation	  of	  British	   economic	   and	   social	  
life	   has	   focused	   especially	   on	   housing	   and	   property	   markets	   with	   heavy	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flows	  of	  credit	  serving	  mainly	  to	  inflate	  prices	  in	  land	  and	  housing	  markets	  
leading	   to	   acute	   affordability	   problems,	   overcrowding,	   homelessness	   and	  
adverse	   health	   effects.	   	   London	   has	   been	   growing	   fast	   in	   population	   and	  
economic	   activity	   but	   not	   proportionately	   in	   its	   housing	   capacity	   so	   it	  
experiences	   extreme	   forms	   of	   these	   effects	   and	   is	   the	   site	   of	   some	  
embryonic	  but	  fragmented	  resistance.	  	  The	  initial	  framing	  of	  the	  problem	  as	  presented	  here	  is	  based	  on	  the	  arguments	  put	   forward	   in	   a	   recent	   report	   (Edwards	  2015)	   commissioned	  by	   the	  Office	   of	  the	   Chief	   Scientist,	   an	   arms-­‐length	   segment	   of	   the	   UK	   civil	   service,	   as	   part	   of	  
Foresight:	   Future	   of	   Cities.	   This	   is	   a	   project	   with	   many	   contributors,	   the	  coordinators	  of	  which	  will	  be	   issuing	  a	   final	  report	  during	  2016.	  The	  summary	  arguments	  here	  are	  only	  lightly	  referenced	  but	  the	  full	  report,	  a	  free	  download,	  has	  much	  greater	  detail.i	  	  
	  
Housing	  in	  the	  UK	  	  The	  British	  housing	   system	   is	  dominated	  by	  private	  ownership	  of	  dwellings	  as	  financial	  assets,	  for	  many	  decades	  as	  owner-­‐occupation	  but	  now	  also	  as	  private	  landlordism.	  The	  social	  relation	  of	  house	  purchase	  and	  asset-­‐value	  appreciation	  is	  widely	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘housing	   ladder’,	  but	   in	  reality	   it	   is	  closer	  to	  snakes	  and	  ladders	  since	  there	  are	  losers	  in	  the	  volatile	  price	  movements	  and	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  UK	  households	  are	  stuck	  with	  homes	  ‘worth’	  less	  than	  the	  debts	  they	  incurred	  to	  buy	  them.	  But	  for	  those	  who	  gamble	  successfully	  —and	  that	  means	  most	  buyers	  who	  maintain	  their	  mortgage	  payments	  in	  the	  southern	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  including	  London—	  the	  system	  is	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  report	  as	  more	  like	  an	  escalator	  than	  a	  ladder:	  a	  social	  process	  which	  converts	  the	  income	  of	  tenants	  and	   new	   buyers	   into	   capital	   appreciation	   for	   established	   owner-­‐occupiers,	  landlords	   and	   financial	   institutions	   and	   profits	   for	   the	   landlords,	   professionals	  and	  construction	  interests	  which	  ride	  on	  the	  process.	  	  	  It	   has	   been	   widely	   argued	   that	   the	   post-­‐2007	   economic	   crisis	   was	   partly	  triggered	  by	  a	  breakdown	   in	   the	  way	   investment	   in	   the	  built	  environment	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  many	  countries	  and	  the	  way	  it	  had	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  a	  fragile	  surge	   of	   rent-­‐seeking	   speculation	   and	   financialisation	   (Martin	   2011;	   Harvey	  2012).	   Its	   origins	   are	   deeper,	   however,	   lying	   partly	   in	   the	   failure,	   since	   the	  1970s,	  of	  personal	  incomes	  to	  grow	  as	  fast	  as	  output	  or	  as	  fast	  as	  consumption—the	  shortfall	  being	  partly	  made	  good	  by	  a	  boom	  of	  credit	  (Glyn	  2006).	  	  Market	  relations	  and	  financialisation	  were	  already	  very	  highly	  developed	  in	  the	  UK	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   became	   increasingly	   so	   in	   the	   1980s,	   impelled	   via	   the	  Thatcher	   government's	   pioneering	   of	   utility	   privatisation,	   Urban	   Development	  Corporations,	   outsourcing	   and	   the	   disposal	   of	   public	   land	   assets	   alongside	   the	  relaxation	  of	   constraints	  on	   the	   financial	   sector,	   especially	   the	  de-­‐regulation	  of	  mortgage	  markets	  (Muellbauer	  2005).	  	  Later	  governments	  promoted	  the	  Private	  Finance	   Initiative	   (PFI),	   persevered	   with	   privatisation	   and	   enforced	   the	  treatment	  of	  publicly	  owned	   land	  and	  equipment	   as	   ‘assets’	   to	  be	  managed	  on	  financial	  principles	  rather	  than	  as	  public	  services	  (Besussi	  2016).	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  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  (2015,	  116)	  reports	  that	  the	  total	  assets	  of	  the	  UK	  financial	  sector	   had	   been	   about	   equal	   to	   one	   year’s	   Gross	   Domestic	   Product	   (GDP)	   in	  1958,	  grew	  to	  about	  2	  years’	  GDP	  by	  1978	  but	  expanded	  dramatically	  to	  reach	  11	  times	  GDP	   in	  2013.	  This	  makes	   the	  British	   financial	   sector	  more	   than	   twice	   as	  dominant	  in	  UK	  economic	  life	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  USA,	  more	  so	  even	  than	  Switzerland,	  famously	  the	  country	  where	  money	  goes	  when	  it’s	  ill.	  	  Financialisation,	   however,	   is	   a	   set	   of	   fundamental	   transformations	   in	   recent	  capitalism,	  not	  merely	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  but	  also	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  think	  and	  behave.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  change	  in	  workers’	  and	   households’	   growing	   dependence	   on	   credit	   to	   secure	   use	   values	   and	  maintain	  an	  acceptable	  standard	  of	   living	  (Lapavitsas	  2013).	   In	  the	  UK	  housing	  field	  we	  can	  see	  all	  of	   these	  strands	  at	  work.	  The	   financial	   sector	  and	   financial	  relationships	  have	  become	  ever	  more	  dominant,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  ways	  households	  manage	   their	   housing	   and	   saving	   strategies	   but	   in	   how	   local	   authorities	   and	  housing	   associations	   are	   now	   constrained	   to	   think	   of	   their	   land	   and	   social	  housing	   as	   ’assets’,	   not	   use	   values,	   and	   to	   manage	   their	   rent	   policies	   and	  allocation	   of	   tenancies	   to	   meet	   the	   imperatives	   of	   securing	   finance.	  Financialisation	  has	  powerful	  cultural	  expressions	  too,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  popular	  TV	  series	   like	   Location,	   Location,	   Location,	   and	   creates	   strong	   imperatives	   on	   the	  work	   of	   built	   environment	   professionals	   whose	   products	   increasingly	   have	   to	  satisfy	   investors’	   criteria.	   The	   entire	   urban	   ensemble	   and	   the	   practices	   of	  participants	   become,	   as	   Louis	   Moreno	   (2014)	   puts	   it,	   both	   a	   product	   of	  financialised	  accumulation	  and	  a	  primary	  instrument	  enabling	  that	  accumulation	  to	  take	  place.	  	  The	   post	   1970s	   ascendancy	   of	   neoliberal	   policies	   of	  monetarism,	   privatisation	  and	   de-­‐regulation	   in	   the	   OECD	   economies	   began	   a	   long	   shift	   characterised	   by	  broadly	  growing	  profitability	  alongside	  this	  financialisation.	  Over	  the	  subsequent	  years	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	   social	   product	   (roughly	   GDP)	   going	   to	   wages	   and	  salaries	   tended	   to	   be	   static	   or	   falling,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   previous	   decades	   in	  which	   the	   wage	   share	   of	   GDP	   had	   tended	   to	   rise	   (Stockhammer	   2013).	   This	  changing	  picture	  is	  illustrated	  by	  Figures	  1	  and	  2	  below	  for	  various	  countries.	  	  A	  great	   deal	   of	   additional	   evidence	   on	   national	   and	   comparative	   change	   is	   to	   be	  found	  in	  the	  recent	  work	  of	  Piketty	  (2013:	  222,	  319-­‐321)	  and	  the	  controversies	  (mostly	  about	  interpretations,	  rather	  than	  evidence)	  that	  it	  is	  generating.	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Figure 1: Adjusted wage share of GDP, advanced countries, 1970-2010 
Source: Stockhammer 2013 Fig 1 	  
	  
Figure 2: Adjusted wage share of GDP, various countries, 1960-2006 
Source: Zeller (2009) 	  Thus	  a	  crucial	  element	  in	  the	  build-­‐up	  to	  today’s	  housing	  problems	  has	  been	  the	  relative	  weakening	   over	   four	   decades	   of	   the	   economic	  position	   of	   the	  working	  population:	  a	  shift	  in	  class	  struggle.	  While	  the	  changes	  in	  employment	  structures	  have	  weakened	  traditional	  working	  classes	  and	  their	  organisations,	  the	  tensions	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in	   society	   increasingly	   play	   out	   in	   urban	   life	   (Cox	   and	  Nilsen	   2014;	  Merrifield	  2014).	   Furthermore,	   income	   inequality	   has	   grown	   within	   the	   working	  population	  so	  that	  real	  incomes	  for	  many	  households	  have	  been	  flat	  or	  declining	  (Wilkinson	   and	   Pickett	   2009;	   Piketty	   2014;	   Atkinson	   2015).	   It	   is	   this	   unequal	  spread	  of	  incomes	  which	  confronts	  the	  cost	  of	  housing	  in	  the	  market	  sector	  —the	  owner-­‐occupier	  market	   and	   the	  private	   rental	  market—	  and	   in	   a	   period	  when	  the	  non-­‐market	  sector	  has	  been	  shrinking.	  	  Across	   the	   UK,	   and	   indeed	   across	   Europe	   and	   beyond,	   the	   failure	   of	   housing	  market	  systems	  to	  ensure	  that	  everyone	  is	  decently	  housed	  is	  recognised	  and	  the	  'housing	   question'	   is	   back	   on	   the	   formal	   political	   agenda	   as	  well	   as	   provoking	  struggles	  by	  social	  movements.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  affordability,	  criticisms	  are	  also	  made	  in	  the	  UK	  of	  floorspace,	  design	  and	  environmental	  standards,	  that	  new	   housing	   in	   the	   UK	   is	   often	   not	   where	   it	   is	   most	   needed,	   and	   that	   the	  construction	   industry	   is	   not	   fit	   for	   purpose.	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	  of	   the	  breakdown	   of	   2007	   there	   was	   a	   wide	   consensus,	   even	   among	   mainstream	  commentators,	   that	   the	   financial	   and	   economic	   relationships	   surrounding	  housing	   which	   had	   emerged	   since	   the	   1980s	   had	   also	   been	   major	   factors	   in	  bringing	  about	  –or	  at	  least	  triggering–	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Within	  this	  broad	  narrative	  affecting	  most	  of	  the	  advanced	  countries,	  there	  were	  important	  differences	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  2007/8.	  The	  ‘credit	  crunch’	  was	  triggered	  by	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   sub-­‐prime	   mortgage	   market	   in	   the	   USA.	   This	   was	   the	  collapse	  of	  the	  securitised	  secondary	  market	  in	  low-­‐grade	  mortgage	  loans	  which	  had	  been	  made	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  	  The	  UK	  had	  a	  smaller	  scale	  of	  equivalent	  lending	  —famously	  most	   fragile	   in	   the	  Northern	  Rock	   collapse—	  but,	   as	  we	  have	   seen	  above,	   a	   uniquely	   large	   financial	   sector,	   which	   proved	   very	   expensive	   for	   the	  state	  to	  bail	  out	  when	  inter-­‐bank	  lending	  stalled.	  	  Societies	   with	   growing	   inequality	   produce	   worsening	   housing	   market	  experiences	   for	  poorer	  people	  and	  more	  pressure	  of	  need	  on	   their	  non-­‐market	  sectors,	  partly	  because	   richer	  people	   can	  outbid	  poorer	  people,	   but	  partly	   also	  because,	  as	  people	  get	  richer,	  their	  consumption	  of	  space	  increases:	  in	  economic	  jargon	  the	  income	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  for	  space	  (indoors	  and	  outdoors)	  is	  high	  (Cheshire	   and	   Sheppard	   1998).	   	   They	   tend	   to	   move	   to	   larger	   homes	   and/or	  acquire	   second	   homes.	   The	   distribution	   of	   housing	   space	   between	   income	  groups	  thus	  becomes	  more	  unequal,	  as	  Dorling	  (2013)	  has	  shown	  in	  detail.	  	  This	  competition	  for	  housing	  space	  has	  been	  intensified	  by	  the	  state-­‐sponsored	  and	   debt-­‐financed	   expansion	   of	   individual	   owner-­‐occupation	   of	   housing,	  reinforced	  by	  the	  near-­‐cessation	  of	  non-­‐market	  housing	  production	  (see	  Figure	  3)	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  inherited	  stocks	  of	  non-­‐market	  housing	  through	  the	  Right-­‐	  to-­‐Buy	   (RTB)	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   privatization	   (see	   Watt	   and	   Minton,	  Introduction	  to	  this	  Special	  Feature).	  With	  home-­‐ownership	  privileged	  in	  various	  ways	   in	   the	   tax	   system,	   UK	   households	   have	   been	   given	   strong	   incentives	   to	  maximise	   their	  ownership	  of	  housing	  as	   the	   core	   strategy	  of	   family	   saving	  and	  wealth	  accumulation	  and	  in	  periods	  of	  easy	  and/or	  cheap	  credit	  a	  majority	  have	  been	  able	   to	  do	  so	   in	  most	  areas	  (Scanlon	  and	  Kochan	  2010;	  Robertson	  2014).	  Households	  simply	  keen	  to	  house	  themselves	  securely,	  and	  without	  that	  wealth-­‐
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accumulation	  motive,	  have	  unwittingly	  been	  part	  of	   the	  same	  process,	  enjoying	  the	  benefits	  of	  asset	  value	  growth	  in	  places	  and	  periods	  where	  it	  has	  taken	  place.	  The	   expansion	   and	   character	   of	   housing	   ownership	   has	   had	   an	   important	  political	   implication	   because	   so	   many	   UK	   households	   now	   have	   a	   personal	  interest	   in	   the	   maintenance	   and	   further	   growth	   of	   prices	   which,	   in	   turn,	   has	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  politicians	  even	  to	  contemplate	  strategies	  which	  would	  undermine	   this	   complex	   dynamic	   by	   bringing	   prices	   down.	   Those	   people’s	  interest	   in	   maintaining	   house	   values	   and	   the	   strong	   tradition	   of	   amenity	  protection	   generate	   ‘not	   in	   my	   back	   yard’	   (NIMBY)	   resistance	   to	   new	  development	  in	  many	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  These	  anti-­‐development	  pressures,	  operating	   through	   planning	   policies,	   combine	   with	   landowners’	   powers	   of	  withholding	   land	   from	   development	   to	   bring	   about	   strong	   growth	   of	   house	  prices	  in	  high-­‐demand	  areas.	  	  The	   UK’s	   strongly	   embedded	   private	   landownership	   still	   peaks	   in	   a	   powerful	  residue	   of	   royal	   and	   aristocratic	   holdings,	   including	   ownership	   by	   institutions	  like	   ancient	   universities	   and	   livery	   companies—	   what	   Massey	   and	   Catalano	  (1978)	   called	   'former	   landed	   property'.	   The	  most	   exhaustive	   study	   for	   Britain	  found	  that,	  "just	  189,000	  families	  own	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  UK’s	  60	  million	  acres,	  of	  which	   nearly	   three-­‐quarters	   is	   owned	   by	   the	   top	   40,000"	   (Cahill	   2001),	   and	  stressed	  the	  extreme	  difficulty	  in	  researching	  the	  topic	  because	  of	  the	  continuing	  lack	  of	  a	  complete	   land	  register.	  The	  transparency	  problem	  is	   in	   the	  process	  of	  being	  addressed	  in	  Scotland	  (LRRG	  2014)	  but	  remains	  a	  major	  defect	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	   land	   and	   property	  markets	   operate	   as	   Shelter	   and	   KPMG	   (2014,	   60)	  have	  stressed	  in	  their	  study	  of	  England	  and	  as	  Peter	  Hetherington	  dissects	  in	  his	  mainly	  rural	  Whose	  Land	  is	  Our	  Land?	  (2015).	  	  Alongside	  and	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  problems	  —	  of	  archaic	  ownerships	  and	  of	  secrecy	   surrounding	   who	   owns	   what	   —	   the	   UK	   experiences	   large	   scale	  ownership	   of	   land	  by	   financial	   institutions	   and	  developers.	  Rather	   little	   recent	  research	   is	  directed	  at	   the	  behaviour	  and	   significance	  of	   these	  owners	  and	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  monopolistic	  or	  oligopolistic	  power	  works	  in	  the	  particular	  cities	  where	  they	  are	  active–or	  where	  they	  decline	  to	  act.	  Strong	  concerns	  about	  the	  probable	  spatial	  concentration	  effects	  of	  pension	  fund	  activity	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  1990s	  by	  Martin	  and	  Minns	  (1995)	  and	  there	  have	  been	  more	  studies	  of	  investor	  behaviour	  than	  of	  land-­‐owner	  influence	  and	  of	  commercial	  rather	  than	  residential	   markets	   (see	   inter	   alia	   Henneberry	   1995;	   Henneberry	   and	   Rowley	  2000;	  Barras	  2009).	  	  	  The	   upshot	   of	   all	   this	   is	   that	   the	   stock	   of	   housing	   in	   the	  UK,	   and	   especially	   in	  England,	   has	   grown	   much	   more	   slowly	   than	   either	   the	   population	   or	   market	  demand,	  especially	  since	  building	  by	  local	  authorities	  was	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  halted	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Figure	  3).	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Figure 3.  UK: Annual completions of dwellings by developer type 1946-
2012 after Barker (2004) Updated from DCLG Live Table 241  	  By	  2007	  the	  stock	  of	  housing	  and	  other	  real	  estate	  assets	  was	  nearly	  90%	  of	  the	  market	   value	   of	   all	   tangible	   assets	   in	   the	   British	   economy,	   dwarfing	   the	  productive	   equipment	   of	   plants,	  machinery,	   vehicles	   and	   so	   on	   (see	   Figure	   4).	  The	   growth	   of	   these	   property	   assets	   has,	   in	   recent	   decades,	   far	   exceeded	   the	  fixed	  capital	  formation	  in	  the	  building	  stock.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  flows	  of	  money	  into	  land	  and	  property	  ownership	  have	  driven	  prices	  up	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent	  than	  they	  have	  brought	  forth	  a	  new	  supply	  of	  useful	  buildings.	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Figure	  4.	  UK:	  Value	  of	  tangible	  assets,	  £m,	  1988-­‐2009,	  	  
Source:	  ONS	  Non-­‐financial	  balance	  sheets	  (annual)	  	  	  With	   prices	   rising	   and	   most	   real	   incomes	   static	   or	   falling,	   many	   households,	  especially	   in	   the	   southern	   half	   of	   the	   UK	   and	   in	   prospering	   cities	   have	   been	  unable	   to	   meet	   their	   expectations	   of	   becoming	   owner-­‐occupiers;	   others	   are	  unable	   to	   access	   the	   social	   housing	   which	   had	   been	   (relatively)	   available	   to	  earlier	   generations	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   decades.	   Both	   of	   these	   groups	   found	  themselves	   diverted	   into	   an	   expanding	   private	   rented	   sector	   (PRS),	   the	  profitability	   of	   which	   attracted	   a	   lot	   of	   new	   investors,	   including	   Buy-­‐to-­‐Let	  landlords.	   This	   sector,	   which	   had,	   by	   the	   1970s,	   become	   small	   and	   focused	   in	  cities,	   expanded	   in	   response	   to	   these	   demands	   and	   to	   the	   removal	   of	   rent	  controls	   and	   tenant	   security	   in	   subsequent	   years	   (see	   Watt	   and	   Minton,	  Introduction	   to	   this	   Special	   Feature).	   While	   this	   may	   be	   a	   tenure	   of	   genuine	  choice	  for	  some,	  it	  delivers	  some	  of	  the	  most	  squalid,	  insecure	  and	  overcrowded	  conditions	   we	   have	   seen	   for	   a	   hundred	   years	   and,	   in	   high-­‐rent	   cities,	   is	   the	  source	  of	  mounting	  discontent	  and	   impoverishment.	  By	  2012	   the	  PRS	  sector	   is	  estimated	  at	  approaching	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  dwelling	  stock:	  18.5%	  in	  England,	  13.8%	  in	  Wales,	  12.8%	  in	  Scotland,	  15.9%	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  thus	  17.7%	  in	  the	  UK	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as	   a	  whole	   (Wilcox	   and	   Perry	   2014).	   Owner-­‐occupation	   in	   England	   and	  Wales	  peaked	  in	  about	  2000	  at	  70%	  and	  has	  since	  been	  falling.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  market	  sector	  in	  housing	  fails	  to	  meet	  all	  society’s	  needs	  and	  is	  now	  often	   described	   as	   "broken";	   the	   term	   is	   used	   over	   100	   times	   in	   Shelter	   and	  KPMG	  (2014).	  The	  need	  for	  a	  non-­‐market	  sector	  grows	  while	  it	  has	  actually	  been	  shrinking.	   The	   combined	   system	   fails	   to	   house	   the	   population	   well,	   amplifies	  inequality	  and	  is	  fragile.	  	  	  The	  recent	  history,	  and	  the	  current	  state,	  of	  housing	  makes	  only	  limited	  sense	  at	  an	  aggregate	  UK	  scale,	  however,	  because	  needs,	  demands	  and	  outcomes	  are	  so	  strongly	   determined	   by	   the	   economic	   dynamics	   of	   individual	   cities	   and	   city-­‐regions	   (and	   their	   related	   'countrysides')	   and	   by	   the	   policy	   history	   of	   semi-­‐autonomous	   local	   planning	   and	   housing	   authorities	   and	   devolved	  administrations.	  These	  spatial	  variations	  are	  of	  mounting	  importance	  as	  uneven	  development	  among	   the	  parts	  of	   the	  UK	  unfolds	   (Martin	  et	  al.	  2016)	  with	  very	  different	  experiences	  of	   rent	  and	  price	   changes,	   scarcities	  and	  other	   influences	  on	  welfare	  and	  economic	  activity.	  	  Within	   cities	   too,	   spatial	   differentiation	   in	   housing	   prices	   and	   rents	   is	   often	  increasing,	   partly	   because	   commuting	   trips	   have	   been	   lengthening	   (Banister	  2007)	  as	  cities	  grow:	  differential	  rents	  tend	  to	   increase	  as	  people	  pay	  more	  for	  better	  accessibility.	   In	  London	   the	   location	  of	  employment	  has	  been	   tending	   to	  centralise	  (Edwards	  et	  al.	  2004;	  GLA	  Economics	  2009;	  Smith	  2011)	  while	   long-­‐distance	   commuting	   has	   grown,	   contributing	   an	   upward	   effect	   on	   prices	   and	  rents	   in	   central	   areas	   and	   places	   with	   good	   transport	   to	   the	   centre.	   Price	  variations	  within	  cities	  also	  reflect	  differences	  in	  access	  to	  the	  best	  schools	  and	  environments	   (Cheshire	   and	   Sheppard	   2004;	   Ahlfeld	   et	   al.	   2012)	   and	   thus	  mediate	  who	  enjoys	  them.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  simplest,	  but	  also	  the	  strongest,	  indication	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  an	  extreme	  case	  in	  the	  pumping	  of	  ‘value’	  into	  its	  housing	  is	  that	  it	  has	  shown	  the	  strongest	  long-­‐term	   growth	   of	   average	   house	   prices	   among	   all	   the	  OECD	   countries	   from	  1970-­‐2013	  (Figure	  5).	  	  
	  10	  	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Annual	  average	  change	  in	  real	  house	  prices	  in	  OECD	  countries	  
over	  the	  period	  1970-­‐2013.	  %	  per	  annum	  compound,	  deflated	  by	  the	  
consumer	  price	  index	  of	  each	  country.	  Source:	  OECD	  Housing	  Prices	  
database	  2014	  	  	  The	   UK	   also	   has	   the	   most	   highly	   developed	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   pervasive)	  investment	  property	  market	  in	  Europe.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  very	  high	  proportion	  of	  UK	  real	  estate	  is	  owned	  by	  investors	  and	  rented	  out	  to	  occupiers,	  and	  this	  is	  so	  even	   though	  we	   have	   very	   little	   residential	   property	   owned	   in	   this	   way.	   Even	  with	  the	  recent	  resurgence	  of	  the	  private	  residential	   letting	  sector,	  only	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  our	  housing	  stock	  is	  investment	  property	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	   ownership	   of	   corporate/institutional	   owners.ii	  Thus,	  most	   of	   the	  UK's	   huge	  investment	  property	  stock	  is	  offices,	  retail	  shops	  and	  centres,	   industrial	  estates	  and	   the	   like	   (Figure	   6).	   The	   biggest	   single	   element	   in	   this	   national	   stock	   of	  investment	  property	  is	  the	  central	  London	  office	  and	  retail	  market,	  reflecting	  the	  city’s	   enormous	   ‘weight’	   as	   real	   estate	   investment:	   a	   good	   bridge	   to	   the	  consideration	  of	  London	  housing	  problems	  which	  follows.	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Figure	  6:	  Size	  of	  Investment	  markets	  in	  property	  in	  European	  countries,	  
2013,	  $m	  Source:	  IPD	  2014	  pers.	  comm.	  	  	  
Housing	  in	  London	  	  London	  has	   long	  represented	  a	  strong	  co-­‐location	  of	  national	  and	   international	  headquarter	   functions,	   financial	   and	  professional	   services	   (especially	   legal	   and	  accounting),	   cultural	   production	   and	   consumption,	   higher	   education,	   specialist	  medicine	   and	   national	   government.	   In	   this	   it	   resembles	   Paris	   but	   few	   other	  major	  cities.	  Notwithstanding	  this	  concentration	  of	  activity,	  London	  declined	   in	  population	  inside	  its	  administrative	  boundary	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  (though	  with	  growth	  in	  surrounding	  counties	  outside	  its	  green	  belt).	  From	  that	  point	  onwards	  London	  has	  expanded	  both	   its	  population	  and	   its	  share	  of	  national	  output	  with	  its	   business	   and	   political	   leaderships	   developing	   and	   pursuing	   the	   city’s	  development	  as	  ‘Global	  City’	  or	  ‘World	  City’.	  These	  concepts	  became	  dominant	  in	  the	   period	   1985-­‐2000	  when	   London	   lacked	   a	  metropolitan	   government	   (Clark	  and	   Moonen	   2012),	   and	   were	   rarely	   challenged	   (Edwards	   and	   Budd	   1997),	  eventually	   becoming	   firmly	   embedded	   in	   the	   planning	   of	   London	   when	   it	  resumed	   in	   2000	   under	   Ken	   Livingstone	   as	   Mayor	   and	   Tony	   Blair	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   (Edwards	  2002).iii	  Although	  Livingstone	  was	   in	  many	  ways	  a	   figure	  of	  the	  Labour	  left,	  he	  felt	  constrained	  to	  reach	  an	  accord	  with	  the	  financial	  and	  real	  estate	  interests	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  to	  have	  their	  support	  on	  a	  number	  of	  key	  policies:	   some	  major	   transport	   improvements	   and	  housing	   (Massey	  2007).	  His	  approach	  to	  housing	  was	  to	  supplement	  the	  limited	  available	  grants	  from	  central	  government	  —which	   in	   any	   case	   he	   could	   not	   control—	  with	   contributions	   of	  land	   and	   money	   from	   private	   property	   developers	   to	   social	   housing	   under	  Section	  106	  of	   the	  Planning	  Act.	  From	  the	  outset	  he	  adopted	  policies	   to	  secure	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this	  objective	   in	   all	   his	  plans	  and	   the	   strategy	  had	   some	  success	   (Bowie	  2010)	  even	  though	  his	  target	  levels	  of	  social	  housing	  provision	  were	  rarely	  met.	  	  London	   grew	   strongly	   in	   the	   new	  millennium	   in	   terms	   of	  migration,	   domestic	  and	  international,	  and	  economic	  activity.	  Prices	  and	  rents	  in	  its	  housing	  markets	  were	   unruffled	   by	   the	   ‘dot-­‐com	   crash’	   and	   surged	   upwards	   until	   the	   credit	  crunch	   hit	   in	   2007.	   Prices	   then	   fell,	   but	   only	   by	   about	   15%	   and	   they	   had	  recovered	   by	   2011	   (Figure	   7).	   Employment	   too,	   while	   faltering	   in	   2008,	   has	  expanded	   faster	   than	   planners	   had	   expected,	   prompting	   the	   economic	  geographer	  Ian	  Gordon	  to	  wonder	  how	  London	  ‘got	  away	  with’—being	  the	  main	  centre	  of	  banking	  and	  finance	  but	  not	  suffering	  a	  major	  downturn	  as	  a	  result.	  He	  concluded	  that	  it	  resulted	  from	  a	  “combination	  of	  public	  sector	  expansion	  (prior	  to	   the	   austerity	   programme),	   safeguarding	   of	   senior	   professional	   jobs,	   and	   a	  massive	  government	  bail-­‐out	  of	  the	  major	  banks’	  wholesale	  operations”	  (Gordon	  2011	   §39).	   Growing	   employment,	   however,	   continued	   to	   exclude	  disproportionate	   numbers	   of	   low-­‐skilled	   people,	   especially	   from	   some	   ethnic	  minorities,	  and	  to	  generate	  more	  and	  more	  in-­‐work	  poverty	  (Wills	  et	  al.	  2009).	  The	  low	  paid	  in	  London	  earn	  much	  the	  same	  as	  the	  low	  paid	  in	  other	  regions	  but	  face	   much	   higher	   housing	   costs.	   Thus	   real-­‐terms	   median	   London	   household	  incomes	   recovered	   fast	   between	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐crash	   (2007-­‐8	   to	   2013-­‐14)	   but	  after	   deducting	   housing	   costs	   they	   experienced	   the	   fastest	   fall	   of	   all	   British	  regions	  (Resolution	  Foundation	  2016).	  Poverty	  and	  inequality	  in	  London	  remain	  severe	   (Trust	   for	   London	  2013;	   Centre	   for	   London	  2015)	   and	   its	   geography	   is	  changing.	  	  	  Poverty	  continues	  to	  be	  produced	  across	   the	  city	  but,	  at	   least	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	   millennium,	   central	   and	   inner	   areas	   of	   London	   have	   been	   the	   home	   to	  growing	   proportions	   of	   professional/managerial	   and	   higher-­‐income	   people	  while	   outer	   areas	   —although	   in	   many	   cases	   remaining	   relatively	   rich	   on	  average—	  have	  been	  experiencing	  growing	  proportions	  of	  poor	  households	  and	  people	  in	  primary	  occupations.	  Neal	  Hudson	  mapped	  these	  changes	  for	  the	  inter-­‐Censal	   period	   2001-­‐11,	   showing	   in	   detail	   how	   moves	   were	   bringing	   richer	  people	  into	  inner	  areas	  like	  Hackney	  and	  Tower	  Hamlets	  and	  poorer	  people	  into	  most	  outer	  suburban	  boroughs	  (Savills	  2014).	  	  	  These	  market-­‐driven	  trends	  pre-­‐date,	  but	  are	  reinforced	  by,	  changes	  to	  the	  social	  security	  regime.	  Since	  2010	   there	  have	  been	  changes	   to	  housing	  benefits	   (caps	  on	  local	  benefits	  related	  to	  local	  market	  rent	  levels)	  and	  caps	  on	  aggregate	  social	  security	  benefits	  which	  are	  rapidly	  making	  many	  of	  the	  areas	   in	  London	  where	  mixed-­‐income	  communities	  had	  reproduced	  themselves	  for	  generations	  become	  unaffordable	   at	   a	   rate	  much	   faster	   than	   had	   already	   been	   caused	   by	   relatively	  stable	  market	  processes.	  The	   resulting	  exodus	  of	  Londoners	   from	  expensive	   to	  cheaper	  parts	  of	  London	  or	  beyond	  was	  predicted	   (Fenton	  2011)	  and	   is	  under	  way	  (Imrie	  and	  Lees	  2014;	  Hanna	  and	  Bosetti	  2015).	  	  	  In	  this	  context	  of	  surging	  population	  and	  employment,	  housing	  supply	  has	  failed	  to	   keep	   pace	   with	   the	   growth	   of	   housing	   need	   and	   of	   market	   demand,	   or	   to	  achieve	   even	   the	   planned	   outputs	   of	   housing,	   especially	   of	   social	   and	   other	  'affordable'	  housing,	  called	  for	  in	  successive	  London	  Plans.	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  London	  planning	  debates	  have	  been	  heavily	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  housing	   supply	   and	   affordability	   (Brown	   et	   al.	   2015)	   and	   substantially	  undermined	   by	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Coalition	   Government	   to	   abandon	   rational	  concepts	   of	   affordable	   housing	   based	   on	   maximum	   proportions	   of	   tenant	  incomes	   and	   to	   create	   a	   new	   term	   “affordable	   rent”	   defined	   as	   up	   to	   80%	   of	  locally-­‐prevailing	  market	  rents.	  This,	  combined	  with	  Mayor	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  switch	  priorities	   away	   from	  housing	   those	   in	  greatest	  need	   to	   supporting	   total	  output	  and	  higher	  income	  people,	  has	  produced	  a	  very	  adverse	  policy	  context.	  	  	  The	  growth	  of	   inequality	   in	  London	  has	  weakened	   the	   capacity	  of	  middle-­‐	   and	  low-­‐income	  groups	  to	  compete	  for	  housing	  space	  within	  the	  market	  stock	  while	  the	   size	   of	   the	   non-­‐market	   —social	   housing—	   stock	   has	   shrunk	   through	   this	  failure	  of	  new	  production	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	   losses	   flowing	   from	  the	  RTB,	   from	  other	  privatisations	  and,	  recently,	  from	  the	  switching	  of	  tenancies	  in	  the	  socially-­‐owned	  stock	   from	  social	  rents	   to	   the	  much	  higher	   'affordable'	  rents	  or	  even,	   in	  some	  cases,	  to	  market	  rents.	  These	  changes	  are	  quantified,	  so	  far	  as	  possible,	  in	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  London	  Tenants	  Federation,	  TCPA	  and	  Just	  Space	  to	  the	  latest	  consultations	  on	  the	  London	  Plan	  (Just	  Space	  2014a).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  it	  is	  clear	   that	   the	   new	   Conservative	   Government	   elected	   in	   2015	   is	   set	   upon	   the	  extinction	  of	  social	  housing	  at	  rents	  affordable	  by	  much	  of	  the	  population.	  
	  The	  provision	  of	  non-­‐market	  housing	  in	  London,	   insofar	  as	  it	  happens,	   is	  costly	  because	  of	  the	  high	  prices	  commanded	  for	  land	  for	  private	  market	  development	  and	  has	  normally	  been	  possible	  only	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  government	  grant	  and	   agreements	   made	   between	   planning	   authorities	   and	   private	   developers	  under	  S106	  to	  secure	  agreed	  proportions	  of	  units	  in	  new	  developments	  as	  social	  or	   'affordable'	   housing	   (Bowie	   2010).	   As	   explained	   above,	   Mayor	   Livingstone	  made	  as	  much	  use	  as	  he	  could	  of	  these	  mechanisms.	  Both	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  weakening,	   however.	   Central	   government	   grants	   for	   social	   and	   'affordable'	  rent	  housing	  have	  been	  reduced	  since	  2010,	  and	  developers	  were	  able	  to	  argue	  that	   the	   fall	   in	   disposal	   prices	   for	   market	   housing	   after	   the	   post-­‐2007	   crisis	  threatened	   the	   'viability'	   of	   projects	   containing	   significant	   social	   housing.	  Government	  ruled	  that	  'viability'	  considerations	  should	  be	  paramount	  and	  even	  that	   pre-­‐existing	   contracts	   could	   be	   re-­‐negotiated	   downwards.	   Even	   now	   that	  disposal	   values	   have	   surpassed	   their	   pre-­‐2007	   levels,	   these	   changes	   remain	   in	  place	   so	   there	   has	   been	   a	   ratcheting-­‐down	   of	   S106	   provisions	   for	   social	   and	  'affordable'	  housing	  (University	  of	  Reading	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Colenutt	  et	  al.	  2015).	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Figure	  7.	  UK,	  London	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK:	  house	  prices	  compared	  2007-­‐
14	  
Source:	  Joe	  Sarling	  using	  ONS	  data.	  	  Housing	   scarcity	   has	   also	   been	   affecting	   those	  with	   somewhat	   higher	   incomes	  who	   would	   previously	   have	   expected	   to	   enter	   owner-­‐occupation,	   with	   large	  numbers	   of	   Londoners	   priced	   out	   of	   housing	   they	   can’t	   afford.	   These	   people,	  along	  with	   those	   excluded	   from	  social	   housing,	   are	   thus	   constrained	   to	   rent	   in	  the	   growing	   PRS	   and	   there	   are	   many	   indicators	   of	   the	   resulting	   strains.	   For	  example	  we	  see	  the	  unprecedented	  formation	  of	  PRS	  tenants'	  campaigns,	  London	  
Renters	  and	  some	  of	  the	  local	  groups	  in	  the	  Radical	  Housing	  Network.	  Nationally,	  the	  Priced	  Out	   campaign	  articulates	   the	  grievances	  of	   renters	  who	  are	  –	  or	   see	  themselves	  as	  –	  would-­‐be	  owner-­‐occupiers.	  The	  sector	  offers	  very	  poor	  security,	  short	   leases,	  unregulated	  rents	  and	  —	  in	  many	  cases	  —	  poor	  health	  and	  safety	  conditions.	  	  The	  PRS	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  overlapping	  series	  of	  sub-­‐markets,	  ranging	  from	  genuinely	  luxury	   houses	   and	   apartments	   to	   slum	   accommodation	   and	   everything	   in	  between.	   A	   distinctive	   niche	   has	   been	   the	   speculative	   development	   of	   rental	  housing	  for	  London’s	  booming	  population	  of	  students,	  or	  at	  least	  for	  those	  from	  elite	  backgrounds	  around	   the	  world	  who	  can	  afford	   to	  pay	  very	  high	  rents	  per	  square	  metre	   for	   their	   rooms.	   This	   has	   been	   highly	   controversial	   both	   among	  lower-­‐income	  students	  and	  for	  progressive	   local	  authorities	  which	  have	  sought	  to	   resist	   these	  developments	  because	   they	   take	  up	   sites	  which	   could	  have	  met	  local	  housing	  needs.	  	  Government	  exhortations,	  following	  the	  Rogers	  Report	  (Urban	  Task	  Force	  1999),	  that	   development	   should	   avoid	   greenfield	   sites	   and	   focus	   on	   previously-­‐developed	   (‘brownfield’)	   land	   reinforced	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   Green	   Belt	   in	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constraining	  the	  supply	  of	  sites	  and	  almost	  all	  house	  building	  in	  London	  has	  been	  on	   ‘previously	   developed	   land’	   in	   the	   last	   decade.	   However,	   given	   the	   very	  extensive	  green	  space	   in	  London	  and	  the	  widespread	  existence	  of	  conservation	  areas,	   this	   has	   created	   very	   strong	   pressures	   for	   land	   use	   change	   from	   almost	  any	   other	   use	   to	   residential.	   Shelter	   and	  KPMG	   (2014:	   35)	   cite	   industrial	   land	  prices	   in	  Croydon	  as	  being	  half	   of	   residential	   land	  prices	   and	   there	   is	  plentiful	  anecdotal	  and	  professional	  evidence	  of	  much	  higher	  ratios.	  Whereas	  many	  other	  British	  cities	  still	  have	  areas	  of	  disused	  or	  lightly	  used	  ex-­‐industrial	  land,	  London	  has	   very	   little	   remaining	   and	   much	   of	   that	   has	   decontamination	   problems	   or	  needs	  costly	  infrastructure	  to	  bring	  it	  into	  use.	  Pressure	  on	  non-­‐housing	  uses	  of	  space	   in	   London	   has	   become	   very	   intense	   indeed	   (Ferm	   and	   Jones	   2015;	   Just	  Space	  2015).	  	  One	   of	   the	  most	   socially	   disruptive	   and	   controversial	   forms	   of	   this	   creation	   of	  ‘brownfield’	   sites	   is	   the	   demolition	   of	   council-­‐built	   housing	   estates	   which	   has	  increasingly	   been	   undertaken	   in	   the	   name	   of	   regeneration,	   often	   without	  adequate	  consultation,	  and	  involving	  disruption	  and	  some	  degree	  of	  dispersal	  of	  established	  communities	  (see	  inter	  alia	  Watt	  2009,	  UCL	  Urban	  Laboratory	  2013;	  Imrie	  and	  Lees	  2014;	  Just	  Space	  2014b;	  see	  Flynn,	  this	  Special	  Feature).	  	  	  The	  market	  sector	  of	  London	  housing	  has	  also	  been	  meeting	  elements	  of	  demand	  which	  are,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  additional	  to	  housing	  the	  city's	  settled	  population.	  These	  include	  investment	  purchases	  by	  UK	  and	  foreign	  residents	  and	  companies	  who	  then	  keep	  the	  flats	  empty	  or	  use	  them	  only	  occasionally.	  This	  category	  blurs	  into	  the	  second	  home/pied-­‐a-­‐terre	  kind	  of	  demand.	  There	  are	  grave	  problems	  in	  defining	   these	   categories	   and	   in	   measuring	   their	   extent.	   Controversy,	   and	  sometimes	  xenophobia,	  surround	  these	  issues	  but	  they	  probably	  are	  responsible	  for	   diverting	   a	   lot	   of	   sites	   which	   could	   otherwise	   be	   meeting	   the	   city's	   more	  ordinary	   demands	   and	   for	   contributing	   to	   rising	   prices,	   especially	   at	   the	  expensive	  end	  of	  the	  markets.	  (See	  Glucksberg	  in	  this	  Special	  Feature)	  	  Finally,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  London's	  housing	  pressures	  of	  course	  reach	  far	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   GLA.	   Needs	   generated	   in	   London	   (especially	  central	  London	  where	  employment	  is	  concentrating)	  are	  perforce	  partly	  met	  in	  the	  surrounding	  villages,	  towns	  and	  cities,	  raising	  prices	  in	  those	  areas	  out	  of	  the	  reach	   of	   many	   who	   work	   there	   and	   occasioning	   the	   need	   for	   very	   heavy	  government	   investment	   in	   rail	   capacity.	   This	   dependence	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  region,	  however,	  is	  entirely	  unplanned	  and	  estimates	  of	  prospective	  ‘overspill’	  to	  other	   areas	   suggest	   magnitudes	   of	   20,000	   London	   worker	   households	   buying	  into	   the	   stock	  beyond	  Greater	  London	  annually	   (NLP	  2014)	  which	   could	  affect	  400,000	   dwellings	   over	   the	   next	   two	   decadesiv	  (see	   also	   Bowie	   2014;	   TCPA	  2015).	  	  	  It	   is	   also	   evident	   that,	   while	   the	   benefits	   of	   agglomeration	   through	   London’s	  continuing	   ‘economic’	   growth	   are	   held	   implicitly	   by	   mainstream	   policy	  communities	   (Mayor	   of	   London	   2014;	   London	   First	   2014)	   to	   be	   boundless,	  without	   these	   heavy	   state	   investments,	   especially	   in	   transport,	   the	   expected	  growth	  simply	  could	  not	  be	  sustained.	  We	  even	  hear	  now	  that	  some	  of	  the	  major	  financial	  employers	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London	  and	  Canary	  Wharf	  are	  returning	  to	  the	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19th	   century	   practice	   of	   providing	   direct	   housing	   for	   their	   workers	   since	   the	  city’s	  market	  mechanisms	   can	  no	   longer	  do	   so.	  My	   tentative	   conclusion	   is	   that	  the	   national	   state	   invests	   in	   infrastructure,	   supported	   by	   the	   imperatives	  outlined	   in	   the	   Mayor’s	   plans,	   while	   the	   benefits	   are	   harvested	   as	   additional	  rents	  accruing	  to	  owners	  of	  property.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  London	  has	  an	  extremely	  'high-­‐value'	  built	  environment	  and	  its	  value	  has	  mushroomed	  in	  recent	  decades,	  generating	  massive	  profits	  and	  capital	  gains	   (rents);	   the	   consequence	   is	   the	   amplification	   of	   inequality	   while	   many	  Londoners	   are	   inadequately	  housed,	   space	   standards	  are	   low,	   value	   for	  money	  poor,	  funds	  for	  social	  and	  physical	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  can't	  be	  found	  and	  the	   environmental	   performance	   of	   the	   resulting	   settlement	   pattern	   is	  substandard.	   Furthermore	   the	   low-­‐	   and	   middle-­‐income	   communities	   and	  individuals	  who	  have	  coexisted	  with	  the	  rich	  for	  generations	  are	  being	  expelled	  painfully	  and	  violently.	  It	  is	  a	  dreadful	  paradox,	  a	  severe	  contradiction.	  	  Put	  like	  this,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  problem	  could	  be	  solved.	  There	  is	  lots	  of	  money	  being	  spent	  on	  housing	  and	  more	  of	  it	  could	  go	  on	  what	  needed	  —	  good	  quality,	  well-­‐designed,	  affordable	  housing	  with	  good	  services,	  environments	  and	  workplaces	  —	  with	  less	  being	  distributed	  as	  profits	  and	  capital	  gains/rents.	  	  It	   is	  as	  though	  there	  were	  two	  kinds	  of	  tax	  in	  society:	  one	  paid	  to	  the	  state	  and	  local	   authorities	   for	   public	   services,	   the	   other	   an	   unofficial	   tax	   paid	   as	   rent	   to	  landlords,	   financial	   institutions,	   developers	   and	   established	   owner-­‐occupiers.	  	  The	   city	   is	   indeed	   the	   wealth	   machine	   and	   poverty	   machine	   it	   was	   evidently	  becoming	  20	  years	  ago	  (Edwards	  2002),	  but	  in	  an	  accelerated	  and	  violent	  form.	  	  	  
Implications	  for	  urban	  theory	  
	  Although	  the	  Foresight	  Future	  of	  Cities	  project	  is	  cast	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  fashionable	  cities	  discoursev,	   this	   framing	  questions	   its	  validity	   in	  two	  ways:	   irstly,	   through	  casting	   doubt	   on	   the	   unbounded	   net	   social	   benefits	   to	   be	   had	   from	   continued	  urban	   concentration.	   Secondly,	   through	   trying	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   social	  relations	  of	  land	  and	  housing	  ownership	  are	  partly	  reflected	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  cities	  and	   their	  attendant	   ‘countrysides’.	  London	  can,	   for	   the	  moment,	  continue	   its	   growth	   but	   only	   through	   its	   interdependence	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  nation	  (and	  indeed	  the	  world)	  in	  terms	  of	  migration,	  commuting	  and	  the	  flows	  of	  materials	  and	  commodities.vi	  Although	  this	  short	  paper	  has	  focused	  strongly	  on	  housing,	  it	  must	  be	  emphasised	  that	  one	  factor	  contributing	  to	  a	  ‘housing	  crisis’	  is	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  scientific,	  social	  scientific	  and	  cultural	  disciplines	  (and	  of	  professions)	  which	  	  has	  made	  it	  so	  hard	  to	  bring	  all	  the	  relationships	  into	  focus	  simultaneously.	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Implications	  for	  action	  	  
City	   has,	   from	   its	   inception,	   paid	   close	   attention	   to	   London,	   to	   the	   ‘World-­‐’	   or	  ‘Global	  City’	   ideologies	  underwriting	   its	  concentration	  of	  wealth	  and	  of	  poverty	  and	   to	   challenges	   from	   among	   its	   citizens	   to	   the	   prevailing	   orthodoxy	   (Wilson	  2015,	  585-­‐6).	  	  The	   main	   political	   parties,	   nationally	   and	   locally,	   have	   so	   far	   shared	   in	   the	  dominant	   triumphalist	   celebration	   of	   London’s	   growth,	   differing	   only	   in	   the	  attention	  paid	  to	  social	  or	  ‘affordable’	  housing.	  Blair,	  Brown	  and	  Livingstone	  did	  channel	   some	   public	   money	   into	   social	   housing	   production	   and	   did	   seek	   to	  leverage	  some	  social	  housing	  out	  of	  the	  profits	  made	  by	  private	  developers	  and	  land	  owners.	  	  The	  Labour	  Party,	  however,	  has	  always	  failed	  to	  halt	  the	  losses	  of	  inherited	   social	   housing	   through	   the	   RTB	   and	   through	   the	   ‘regeneration’	   of	  estates	   in	   ways	   which	   decimated	   their	   social	   housing	   content	   (see	   Watt	   and	  Minton,	  Introduction	  to	  this	  Special	  Feature).	  	  Undoubtedly	  a	  majority	  of	  London	  residents	  and	  workers	  are	  suffering	  severely	  from	   the	  housing	   crisis—	  uprooted,	   forced	   into	   frequent	  and	  disruptive	  moves	  between	  insecure	  private	  tenancies,	  squeezed	  between	  high	  rents	  and	  low	  wages	  (a	   chasm	   once	   bridged	   by	   various	   social	   security	   benefits,	   now	   being	  withdrawn),	  overcrowded	  or	  literally	  homeless.	  These	  oppressions	  should	  surely	  breed	  resistance.	  	  It	  has	  been	  slow	  to	  emerge,	  I	  suggest,	  mainly	  because	  the	  social	  relations	   involved	   in	   a	   financialised	   housing	   system	   are	   divisive.	   Owner-­‐occupiers	  and	  would-­‐be	  owner-­‐occupiers	  are	  set	  against	  tenants;	  council	  tenants	  (among	   whom	   there	   is	   still	   a	   tradition	   of	   collective	   solidarity)	   and	   private	  tenants	   find	   difficulty	   in	   organising	   together	   while	   squatters	   tend	   to	   be	  demonised	  by	  many	  of	  those	  conventionally	  housed.	  	  	  We	  do,	   though,	  now	  have	  a	  variety	  of	   social	  movements	  developing	   in	  London,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  discussed	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  Special	  Feature,	   including	  Focus	  E15,	   the	  Radical	  Housing	  Network,	   Priced	  Out,	   London	  Renters	   and	   Just	   Space	  (Lipietz	   2014)	   in	   which	   I	   am	   working.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   these	  fragments	  can	  coalesce	  as	  coherent	  social	  movements.	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  ‘housing	  expert’	  and	  doubted	  whether	  I	  should	  do	  work	  which	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  complicit	  with	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Coalition	  Government	  of	  the	  day.	  In	  the	  end	  I	  agreed	  because	  for	  so	  long	  critical	  social	  scientists	  have	  belaboured	  governments	  for	  taking	  advice	  only	  from	  academics	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  project.	  ii	  Mark	  Weedon	  at	  IPD	  —the	  independent	  Investment	  Property	  Databank	  —	  estimates	  that	  the	  institutionally-­‐owned	  rental	  housing	  stock	  is	  only	  about	  30-­‐50,000	  dwellings	  in	  2013,	  compared	  with	  the	  total	  of	  about	  5	  million	  privately	  rented	  units	  (pers.	  com.).	  iii	  The	  role	  of	  think	  tanks	  in	  elaborating	  this	  discourse	  is	  brilliantly	  analysed	  by	  Tom	  Slater	  (2016).	  iv	  	  Similar	  concerns	  have	  been	  expressed	  by	  organisations	  as	  diverse	  as	  the	  TCPA	  and	  the	  HBF	  in	  evidence	  to	  the	  London	  Plan	  EiP	  2014.	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  v	  I	  am	  referring	  here	  to	  the	  rather	  triumphalist	  view	  of	  “cities”	  and	  their	  agglomeration	  economies	  as	  the	  engines	  of	  competitive	  economic	  and	  cultural	  life,	  best	  exemplified	  in	  the	  London	  context	  by	  the	  work	  of	  the	  LSE’s	  Urban	  Age	  programme	  and	  the	  think	  tank	  Centre	  for	  Cities.	  vi	  There	  is	  something	  to	  be	  said	  for	  elements	  of	  the	  Planetary	  Urbanisation	  approach	  in	  which	  the	  whole	  world	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  penetrated	  by	  urban	  relationships	  (Shaw,	  2015,	  	  Catterall	  and	  Wilson	  2014).	  
